Philosophical Concepts Without Boundaries?
On the inconsistency of terminology in an international discipline
From the outside, philosophy often appears as a discipline of big questions: What is truth? What is justice? What is the human being?
But those who engage more intensively with philosophy quickly encounter a paradoxical experience: Precisely where the universal is concerned, the common is often missing. Terms that seem clearly defined reveal themselves as historically evolved, culturally shaped, and systematically differently charged constructions.The inconsistency of philosophical terminology is not merely a marginal phenomenon – it is both a structural feature and an epistemological challenge.
Philosophy as a linguistically plural foundational science
Unlike the natural sciences, where concepts can be stabilized through empirical reference, philosophy operates essentially in the realm of the pre-conceptual: It inquires into the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, ethics, and language itself. This foundational function means that concepts here are not just tools but part of what is being examined.
A vivid example is the concept of “freedom.” While the English language distinguishes between freedom (freedom from external constraints) and liberty (civil-political freedom) (Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, 1958), French mainly knows liberté – a concept closely interwoven with France’s republican self-understanding.
In German, meanwhile, “Freiheit” carries both metaphysical and political meanings and is frequently understood in the Kantian tradition as “autonomy” (Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785) – which in turn evokes different associations in the Anglo-Saxon world.
Between tradition and innovation: The burden of history
The diversity of philosophical concepts is also the result of a long and discursively conducted tradition. Anyone who uses the term “substance,” for instance, walks a fine line: In Aristotle, ousia denotes what underlies a thing (Aristotle, Metaphysik, ca. 340 BCE).
For Descartes, however, substance is that which can exist through itself alone – God and the thinking self (Descartes, Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, 1641). Spinoza, in turn, reverses the relationship and speaks only of a single substance in which everything exists (Spinoza, Ethica, Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata, 1677). The same term, but three fundamentally different ontologies.
This historical polyphony continues in the global context: In Chinese philosophy, for example, there is no exactly equivalent concept of “subjectivity” in the Western sense. Concepts such as Xin (heart-mind) or Li (principle) fulfill similar functions but operate within an entirely different metaphysical framework (see Ames & Hall, Thinking Through Confucius, 1987). Translations here reach their limits not only linguistically but also philosophically.
Terminology as a question of power
Concepts are never neutral. To define is to demarcate. To name is to claim interpretative authority. This becomes particularly evident in postcolonial philosophy: African or indigenous forms of thought were long not recognized as “philosophy” because they did not conform to the formal criteria of Western rationality – criteria that are themselves philosophically contingent. Only through critical reflection on its own conceptual tradition does Western thinking begin to become aware of its cultural predispositions (Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa, 1988).
A current example is the concept of “personhood.” In Western-influenced human rights debates, personhood is often considered a prerequisite for moral and legal recognition (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971). In African Ubuntu philosophies, however, personhood is thought of relationally: “A person is a person through other persons” (Ramose, African Philosophy Through Ubuntu, 1999). The question of what constitutes a person cannot be answered universally without considering the respective conceptual framework.
Perspectives for a plural philosophy
How, then, should we deal with terminological inconsistency? One possibility is conscious conceptual work: Philosophy must always reflect on, clarify, and – where necessary – newly propose its central concepts. This also means exposing oneself to the risk of misunderstandings. Yet this very risk is productive. It compels dialogue, precision, self-correction.
A second possibility is openness to intercultural perspectives. Philosophy that moves only within a single linguistic and intellectual horizon remains blind to the relativity of its own concepts. The exchange between Latin American liberation philosophies (Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, 1985), Eastern wisdom traditions, and Western systematic philosophy entails not only translation problems but also opportunities for insight.
Conclusion
The inconsistency of philosophical terminology is not a deficiency to be eliminated – it is an expression of the depth and scope of philosophical reflection. Yet it demands from all who engage with this discipline a special care in dealing with language. Philosophy often begins where one cannot simply presuppose what a concept means. It begins in dispute – not about words, but about the world that only becomes visible through words.
Sources
Berlin, Isaiah (1958). Two Concepts of Liberty. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kant, Immanuel (1785). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch.
Aristotle (ca. 340 BCE). Metaphysik. [Translation e.g. by Hermann Bonitz, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1989].
Descartes, René (1641). Meditationes de Prima Philosophia [Meditations on First Philosophy]. Paris: Michel Soly.
Spinoza, Baruch de (1677). Ethica, Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata [Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order]. Amsterdam: Jan Rieuwertsz.
Ames, Roger T. & Hall, David L. (1987). Thinking Through Confucius. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Mudimbe, Valentin-Yves (1988). The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ramose, Mogobe B. (1999). African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books.
Dussel, Enrique (1985). Philosophy of Liberation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books. [Originally published in 1980 in Spanish as Filosofía de la Liberación].